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Abstract
Numerous authors point to a decline in joint liability microcredit, and
rise in individual liability lending. But empirical evidence is lacking,
and there have been no rigorous analyses of possible causes. We first
show using the well-known MIX Market dataset that there is evidence
for a decline. Second, we show theoretically that commercialization–an
increase in competition and a shift from non-profit to for-profit lending
(both of which are present in the data)–drives lenders to reduce their
use of joint liability loan contracts. Third, we test the model’s key
predictions, and find support for them in the data.
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1 Introduction
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), and in particular Muhammad Yunus’ Grameen
Bank, have long attracted the interest of economists for their success in lend-
ing to poor borrowers written off as uncreditworthy by traditional lenders.
A large literature analyzes the innovative contractual tools used by MFIs to
achieve this, of which the best known is joint liability lending (JL), whereby
the borrower and one or more group members assume liability for one an-
other’s debts. Joint liability has been shown to be able to overcome problems
of adverse selection, moral hazard and limited enforcement, leveraging social
collateral that can substitute for the conventional collateral that the poor, by
definition, lack.1
In the recent literature it has become common to see claims of a widespread
decline in the use of JL.2 Yet such claims are anecdotal, typically pointing
to high-profile examples such as Grameen, BancoSol, and ASA who initially
pioneered the use of joint liability credit yet have since moved to an individual
liability (IL) lending model. Moreover, as yet we are aware of no satisfactory
account of what has changed about the lending environment, if indeed there
has been a change, to reverse the initial success of JL.
This paper makes two contributions. First, we use the best available data
(the institution-level dataset collected by the MIX Market) to assess empir-
ically whether there is evidence of a trend away from joint liability credit.
Although our data on lending methodology are incomplete and span only the
years 2008-2011, they do indicate a trend toward IL.
Second, we argue theoretically and empirically that the trend can be ex-
plained, at least in part, by commercialization. By commercialization, we
refer to two forces. First, as we document below, the microcredit industry
has shifted from being largely made up of non-profit and NGO lenders to an
1For a detailed review of both the theory and history of JL, see Ghatak and Guinnane
(1999) and Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2010).
2E.g. Hermes and Lensink (2007), Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2010), Breza
(2011), Giné, Krishnaswamy and Ponce (2011), Feigenberg, Field and Pande (2013),
Carpena et al. (2013), Giné and Karlan (2014).
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increasingly for-profit marketplace. Second, competition among lenders for
borrowers has increased, leading to an expansion of the sector.3
We present a simple model that makes three empirical predictions. First,
for-profit lenders are less likely to use JL than non-profits. Second, competition
induces non-profits to switch from JL to IL. Third, interestingly and in contrast
to the broad trend, competition induces for-profits to switch from IL to JL.
While the three effects are not all in the same direction, the net effect is such
that beginning from an uncompetitive, largely non-profit market, increasing
competition and increasing the for-profit share in the market both lead to
increases in the use of IL.
Intuitively, the main driving force in our model is that JL involves tighter
incentive constraints than IL, since in some states of the world, it involves
not only repaying one’s own loan, but also helping a group-member repay
her loan. At the same time, the advantage of JL is, because any given loan
gets repaid with greater probability, the borrower gets to maintain access to
credit from the lender, and depending on the market structure, the interest
rate could go down. Non-profits choose whatever lending arrangement has
higher borrower welfare, subject to the incentive constraints and a break-even
constraint. Under non-profits, competition tends to reduce the use of JL as it
improves the borrower’s outside option, reduces the cost of losing her existing
contract and thus tightening the more demanding incentive constraint, namely,
that under JL. The non-profit offers JL whenever it breaks even, because JL
maximizes borrower welfare. The for-profit also requires JL to break even,
but additionally it must be more profitable than IL. Since this is a stricter
condition, the for-profit ends up offering JL to fewer borrowers. Finally, as
competition increases for-profits tend to use JL more (unlike non-profits) as
revenue under JL is less sensitive to the borrower’s outside option than under
IL.
3In some cases the process of commercialization has not been without problems, which has
often attracted attention to the sector for the wrong reasons. This is seen most dramatically
in the credit crisis in Andhra Pradesh, India, that in 2010 led regulators to temporarily shut
the industry down completely, and subsequently to the drafting of a proposed nationwide
law regulating the industry.
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We then test the implications of the model empirically. Exploiting within-
region, within-country and within-MFI variation in market composition and
proxies for competition, we find support for all three predictions. We find
that for-profit lenders indeed tend to use JL less than non-profits. Both types
of lenders change their offerings in the predicted directions when competition,
measured with various proxies, increases. Although, given the data, we cannot
perfectly resolve the issue of identification, our findings are robust to inclusion
of a broad range of controls, interactions and fixed effects, and hold for two
alternative measures of IL and JL usage intensity and four panel sampling
frames.4 We take further comfort from the fact that the model’s prediction for
for-profits’ response to changes in competition–which is strongly supported in
the data–is in the opposite direction to overall trends and therefore provides
a particularly strong test of the theory.
Our theory fits into a branch of the literature that highlights the leverage
of social capital, especially through JL lending, as a key feature of microcre-
dit.5 Our model explains changes in the use of JL via changes in the level
social capital required for an MFI to be willing to offer JL. Since we cannot
observe social capital, nor any reasonable proxies that we can match to our
data, our main identifying assumption is that changes in the unobservable so-
cial environment are uncorrelated with changes in the market structure and
competitive environment, conditional on our various controls and fixed effects.
At least in the short run, we believe that this is a plausible assumption.
We are not in fact the first to note an association between commercializa-
4The results are however sensitive to the inclusion of data from one country, Peru, which
we exclude from our main specifications. Appendix A.1 demonstrates the sensitivity and
Table 12 presents the results including Peru for the three alternative measures of competi-
tion. The coefficient pattern is qualitatively consistent throughout, but the point estimates
are much smaller in magnitude when Peru is included. The results are not sensitive to
inclusion/exclusion of any other country or MFI. Our preferred competition measures, bank
branch and ATM density, grew extremely rapidly in Peru over our four year time window
(driven by the three largest cities) which may mean that our competition proxies are per-
forming more poorly in Peru and will tend to depress the coefficients on these measures
toward zero.
5E.g. Besley and Coate (1995), Ahlin and Townsend (2007), Ghatak and Guinnane
(1999), Cassar and Wydick (2010), de Quidt, Fetzer and Ghatak (2016), de Quidt, Fetzer
and Ghatak (forthcoming), Karlan (2005), Karlan (2007).
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tion and the decline of JL. Karlan and Zinman (2009) write:6
[T]he industrial organization of microcredit is trending toward some-
thing that looks more like the cash loan market: for-profit, more
competitive delivery of untargeted, individual liability loans... This
evolution is happening from both the bottom-up (non-profits con-
verting to for- profits) and the top-down (for-profits expanding into
subprime and consumer segments).
However to our knowledge we are the first to outline the theoretical and
empirical case for a causal relationship from the former to the latter.
In related work, Cull, Demirgüç-kunt and Morduch (2009) use an early
version of the MIX Market data to provide an extensive descriptive overview
of the microcredit industry. Notably, they observe that non-profits are more
likely than for-profits to use JL lending methods, as our model predicts and
as we also observe in our chronologically later and larger sample. McIntosh,
De Janvry and Sadoulet (2005) show empirically that increasing competition
between lenders in Uganda harmed repayment performance, in line with the
mechanism proposed in our paper (they put more weight on a multiple bor-
rowing interpretation than weakened repayment incentives, though the latter
must naturally go in hand with the former; our model features only the second
channel). McIntosh and Wydick (2005) study theoretically the effects of com-
petition on lenders’ ability to cross-subsidize between clients who vary in their
wealth. Baland, Somanathan and Wahhaj (2013) also study the choice be-
tween JL and IL contracts, focusing on the relationship with borrower wealth
and arguing that wealthier borrowers are better served by JL. Our conceptu-
alization of competition closely relates to Hoff and Stiglitz (1997) and Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984).
In this paper, we focus on the purely positive question of how and why the
types of lending contracts used by MFIs are changing over time, analyzing the
consequences of an exogenous increase in commercialization for the contracts
6See also Karlan and Zinman (2010).
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offered in the market. Our goal is to provide structure and evidence to the dis-
cussions around the decline of joint liability. Elsewhere, de Quidt, Fetzer and
Ghatak (2016), we focus on a different, normative question: the welfare conse-
quences of different microcredit market structures. We use a restricted version
of the model in that paper, specifically assuming that a) the borrower’s outside
option (if she defaults on her current loan) is completely determined by the
loans available to her from competitor MFIs, and b), that the distribution of
social capital is homogeneous. That additional structure provides us with the
tractability to solve for welfare under three equilibria of interest: monopolistic
non-profit or for-profit lending, and perfect competition. But it precludes the
comparative static analysis on gradual changes to market structure we need
for the questions of interest to this paper.7
Existing empirical work comparing IL and JL tends to focus on comparing
the impact of credit under different contracts, or the relative performance of
the two contract forms on repayment and other outcomes. Giné and Karlan
(2014) show that converting joint liability groups to individual liability groups
at an MFI in the Philippines did not affect average repayment rates (the
average effect is a precisely-estimated zero). Carpena et al. (2013) study a
natural experiment in which an Indian MFI switched from using IL to JL,
exploiting variation in the switch date determined by the maturity of previous
loans. They find a substantial improvement in repayment rates, in line with
the model we use in this paper. Mahmud (2015) uses a similar strategy to
study the decision by a Pakistan MFI to switch to JL, and again finds positive
repayment effects. Attanasio et al. (2015) randomized Mongolian borrowers
into either JL, IL or a control (no credit treatment). They find some positive
economic impacts of access to JL credit, no significant impacts of IL credit,
and no difference in repayment rates. Overall, the evidence seems consistent
with JL (weakly) improving repayment rates, as it does in equilibrium in our
7Using a variant of the model, with only non-profit lenders, de Quidt, Fetzer and Ghatak
(forthcoming) analyzes theoretically under what conditions individual liability can perform
as well as joint liability in terms of repayment and borrower welfare, motivated in particular
by the evidence in Giné and Karlan (2014). Allen (forthcoming) also works with a very
similar model, studying structurally the optimal extent of “partial” joint liability.
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model, though it should be noted that the two randomized studies do not find
significant effects.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the three stylized
facts that motivate the theory. In section 3 we present the model and the
theoretical analysis. In section 4 we present the empirical results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Three stylized facts
This section documents three simple stylized facts: 1) the share of for-profit
MFIs and the microfinance industry as a whole have grown dramatically over
time (the forces we term “commercialization”); 2) three plausible proxies for
the competitiveness of the sector (capturing borrowers’ outside options) have
grown over our sampling period; and 3) the use of joint liability has declined.
We defer a detailed description of the dataset for later. In addition to the
later discussion in the text, Web Appendix A contains an extended discussion
of figure construction and alternative approaches.
First we show a gradual increase in the share of for-profit MFIs over the last
two decades. The top left panel of Figure 1 graphs a measure of the fraction
of MFIs that lend for profit, over time. We reconstruct this time-series using
data on for-profit/non-profit status from the MIX Market, as reported to the
MIX in 2011. Combining this information with MFIs’ founding dates, we can
plot the evolution of for-profit and non-profit lending over time. We observe
a gradual upward trend in the share of for-profit lenders over the period.8
8There are four potential biases in this figure. First, we cannot observe historical market
shares, so we weight each MFI equally (weighting according to size in 2008-2011 does not
affect the trend). If non-profit MFIs have increased lending significantly faster than for-
profits (we suspect unlikely, since for-profits are more likely to raise commercial funds for
lending), the true upward trend in for-profit market share would be lower. Second, survivor
bias: MFIs that failed before data collection by MIX will not appear in the data. If for-
profits fail more frequently than non-profits, it could be that the true for-profit share has
not increased as much as it appears to have done. Third, we do not observe changes in profit
status, only the status as of 2011. However, inspecting changes in legal status (e.g. NGO to
non-bank financial intermediary) over 2008-2011, we suspect that these are relatively rare
compared to new entries, and changes are more likely to be from NGO to other forms that
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Figure 1: Three Stylized Facts. Top left and right: growth in the share of
for-profit MFIs and the number of MFIs per country. Bottom Left: growth
of proxies for competitiveness. Bottom right: growth of individual liability
lending.
Second, in the top right figure we document that the average number of
MFIs per country roughly doubled over the same period, using the same sam-
pling frame and data on founding dates.
Third, in the bottom left figure we document growth in three country-level
variables that arguably proxy for credit market competition and are commonly
are more likely to be for-profit, see further discussion below. Finally, we can only include
data for MFIs that report to MIX, including their profit status and founding dates; if non-
profits and for-profits’ report at different rates as a function of founding date, the picture
would change. In general, we expect each of these concerns to primarily affect the level of
the for-profit share, rather than the qualitative trend.
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referred to as proxies of financial access or financial depth (see e.g. Levine,
2005; Čihák et al., 2013).9 We plot the growth of financial access, measured
by the Commercial Bank Branch density and ATM density, and, the evolution
of financial depth, measured as the domestic credit provided by the financial
sector, relative to GDP. Using the set of countries that we observe in the MIX
data between 2008-2011, we plot simple cross-country averages over time.10 Fi-
nancial access has expanded steadily over time: the number of bank branches
per 1 million inhabitants has increased from 9.05 to 13.7 over our period. The
prevalence of ATM follows a similar pattern. Financial depth, as measured by
domestic credit, has expanded by around 26% over the sample period. Our
empirical strategy relies on these variables forming a valid proxy for compe-
tition. For the formal banking sector, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic
(2004) is one of several papers that suggests that financial access and depth
are positively associated with competition. Unfortunately, we were not able
to find any reliable direct measures of the competitiveness of the microfinance
sector: in particular, the selection of MFIs into and out of the MIX Market
data that we discuss in detail make it impossible in our view to construct
useful competitiveness measures from these data.
The bottom right figure attempts to illustrate the change in MFI lending
methodologies over time. This is a challenge. Primarily, our panel is short,
while we are interested in long-run trends. Second, as we explain below, re-
porting limitations constrain us to examining within-MFI trends. We do the
best we can given the data limitations, and find evidence of a trend toward IL
in the 2008-2011 period.
For each MFI we compute, for each year it is available, the fraction of IL
loans by number (i.e. ignoring loan size. Weighting by size gives a very similar
picture). Only around a quarter of MFIs report this variable in every year of
9These are available from the World Bank Development Indicators and have been col-
lected mainly through the Financial Access Surveys, maintained by the International Mon-
etary Fund. This data has been used in the past to study outreach of the financial sector,
e.g. by Beck (2007) or Ahlin, Lin and Maio (2011).
10The picture is very similar if we weight by size of MFIs or number of MFIs in the
relevant country, i.e. assigning more weight to countries with larger MFI sectors.
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our data, and two thirds report in at least two years. Therefore looking at
cross-sectional means over time risks confounding changes in actual lending
practices with selection into and out of the sample. We instead plot only
within-MFI changes. In other words, we show the evolution of the average
MFI’s IL share over time, taking out changes in the composition of that av-
erage. We regress IL shares on year and MFI fixed effects, then plot the year
fixed effects. We use both a “strongly balanced” panel of 348 (340) MFIs that
report every year by Number of Loans (Gross Loan Portfolio), and a “weakly
balanced” panel of 879 (832) MFIs that report at least twice by Number of
Loans (Gross Loan Portfolio). Both indicate a roughly 2 percentage point
increase in the share of IL loans over the period.11 12
3 Model
Our starting point is a model of credit under weak enforcement, as in Besley
and Coate (1995). There is a population of atomistic, risk neutral borrowers.
Borrowers are homogeneous and each period have access to a productive tech-
nology that requires one unit of capital and produces R > 1 units of output
with probability p > 0 (success), and nothing otherwise (failure). Borrowers
do not have access to a saving technology so must borrow one unit of capital
each period if they wish to invest.13 Borrowers’ liability is limited to their cash
11Giné and Karlan (2014) report similar figures for 2007-2009, also using the MIX data.
However, in 2007 just 31 institutions reported their lending methodology, hence our focus
on 2008-2011.
12An alternative approach to constructing the figure would be to weight by MFI size, to
account for relative growth of lenders according to their methodology (e.g. predominantly
IL lenders growing, or predominantly JL lenders shrinking). This is only possible in the
strongly balanced panel. We find that the picture is less clear than for the within-MFI
changes, with the caveat that it is unclear to us how one should best weight MFIs in this
calculation. Finally, ideally we would like to also account for entry/exit of lenders according
to lending methodology. Given our data this is simply not possible, as we only observe
founding dates up to 2009 and essentially all entry into or exit from our sample is driven by
reporting, not MFI founding or closure.
13This is a common assumption in the literature, and some form of saving constraint is
required to avoid a Bulow and Rogoff (1989) unravelling of the dynamic repayment incentives
used by the lender. It does not appear unreasonable in the microcredit context, see e.g.
Dupas and Robinson (2013a,b).
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on hand, so they cannot repay if unsuccessful. They discount exponentially
with discount factor δ.14
There are one or more lenders, who each face a gross opportunity cost
of funds equal to ρ. If the borrower is successful in obtaining a loan, she
borrows 1 each period and repays gross interest rate r. If she defaults, her
contract is terminated and she receives no future loans from that lender. In the
equilibria we focus on she will repay with some probability pi (i.e. paying pir in
expectation each period), and her contract will be renewed with probability pi.
If it is terminated, she becomes “unmatched” and receives continuation value
U (e.g. the option value of waiting for a new lender to offer her a contract).
The value function of a borrower who has received a loan is therefore
V = pR− pir + δpiV + δ(1− pi)U = pR− pir
1− δpi +
δ(1− pi)U
1− δpi .
Lenders can offer either IL or JL contracts. An IL contract requires a
borrower to repay her loan, otherwise her contract is terminated. She faces
one choice: to repay when successful. If the contract makes her better off
repaying, she repays whenever successful, i.e. with probability piIL = p.
A JL contract binds together a pair of borrowers and requires both loans to
be repaid, otherwise both contracts will be terminated. This gives borrowers
an incentive to repay on behalf of an unsuccessful partner, an incentive that
can be strengthened by the use of social sanctions.15 However it might also
induce a successful borrower to default rather than repay on behalf of her
unsuccessful partner. In the latter case it is straightforward to show that IL
can earn both higher profits and higher borrower welfare than JL, so JL will
14The benchmark model assumes the borrower wants to borrow every period, but easily
extends to the possibility that with some probability x she discovers at the beginning of
the period that she will never want to borrow again (e.g. because she loses access to the
investment technology, or because of a positive wealth shock). In this case, her effective
discount factor becomes δ′ = δ(1− x) because with probability x the continuation value of
the loan contract falls to zero. A similar modification can allow for the case where she only
wants to borrow infrequently.
15A possibility that we do not consider in this paper (because it does not arise in equi-
librium under our assumptions) but analyze extensively in de Quidt, Fetzer and Ghatak
(forthcoming) is that IL borrowers might also assist one another with repayment.
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not be offered. In the former, both loans are repaid whenever at least one
borrower succeeds, with probability piJL = p(2− p).16 We define
q ≡ p(2− p).
Borrower welfare under IL and JL therefore equals:
V IL =
pR− pr
1− δp +
δ(1− p)U
1− δp (1)
V JL =
pR− qr
1− δq +
δ(1− q)U
1− δq . (2)
The first incentive constraint, IC1, is identical under IL or JL: the borrower
must be willing to repay her own loan (under JL: when her partner is also
repaying). If she does, she renews her contract and receives continuation value
V , if she does not, she becomes unmatched and receives U . The condition is
thus δV − r ≥ δU , which simplifies to:
r ≤ δpR− δ(1− δ)U ≡ rIC1(U). (3)
Under JL there is a second constraint, IC2: the borrower must be willing
and able to repay on behalf of her unsuccessful partner. Her choice is to
either repay two loans and renew her contract, receiving V , or default. If she
defaults, her contract is terminated and she faces a social sanction of size S,
so she receives U − S.17 Thus the condition is δV − 2r ≥ δ(U − S), or:
r ≤ δpR− δ(1− δ)U + δ(1− δq)S
2− δq =
rIC1(U) + δ(1− δq)S
2− δq ≡ rIC2(U, S).
(4)
16For simplicity, we assume throughout the symmetric equilibrium such that successful
borrowers always repay their own loan when their partner was successful, and repay both
when their partner was unsuccessful. This maximizes expected borrower welfare and has
the weakest incentive compatibility conditions over all (time-invariant) repayment rules.
17An obvious question is why the JL version of IC1 does not include an S term, i.e. why
does a JL borrower’s partner not sanction her for defaulting? The reason is that under JL,
the partner has no reason to threaten a social sanction in this case: if IC1 is violated it is
optimal for both borrowers to default.
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Only one of IC1 or IC2 can bind, depending on the level of S. IC2 is tighter
if:
S ≤ pR− (1− δ)U = S¯(U). (5)
We take social capital, S, to be a measure of all the informal means bor-
rowers can use to persuade one another to assist with repayment. These can
include loss of reputation, loss of a friendship, shame, non-pecuniary punish-
ments, et cetera.18 We assume that S is symmetric within borrowing groups,
is observable to the lender (so the lender can base his contract offer on S), and
distributed in the population with cumulative density F (S).
For IC1 to hold it must be that V > U : alternative sources of credit cannot
be so freely available that the borrower is always better off defaulting on her
current loan and taking her outside option. We therefore assume there is excess
demand for credit (credit rationing), ensuring that a) lenders are free to set
the interest rate and b) lenders can always costlessly replace a terminated
borrower.19
Finally, we must check whether the borrower is able to repay, i.e. check
the relevant limited liability constraint(s) (LLC). IC1 implies r < R, so the
borrower can always repay at least one loan. Under JL the borrower must
sometimes repay two loans, requiring 2r < R.20 For simplicity we impose a
parameter restriction that ensures that the LLC never binds, but note that our
qualitative results do not depend upon this and that the equivalent restriction
would become weaker if we allowed for larger borrowing groups or for borrower
output to take intermediate values between 0 and R. In equilibrium, IC1
ensures that r can never exceed δpR, so we assume δpR < R
2
or:
18For further discussion, see de Quidt, Fetzer and Ghatak (forthcoming) and de Quidt,
Fetzer and Ghatak (2016).
19If the borrower’s outside option derives exclusively from access to alternative MFI
lenders, credit rationing is guaranteed in equilibrium (de Quidt, Fetzer and Ghatak, 2016).
20Obviously this is a somewhat restrictive condition: the borrower’s income when suc-
cessful must exceed the full repayment of two loans. Its restrictiveness stems from two of
our key simplifying assumptions: groups of size two and the Bernoulli income distribution.
A smoother income process (such that the unsuccessful partner can contribute to her re-
payment) and bigger groups (so the repayment burden can be split across more successful
partners) relax the LLC. See, for example, the simulation results in de Quidt, Fetzer and
Ghatak (forthcoming).
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Assumption 1 δp < 1
2
.
3.1 Non-profit lender
The non-profit chooses the contract that maximizes borrower welfare, sub-
ject to IC1, IC2 and a zero-profit condition: pir ≥ ρ, where pi is the repay-
ment probability. We denote equilibrium values (for example, utilities, interest
rates) under non-profit lending with a “hat” (e.g. xˆ). The non-profit interest
rates under IL and JL are:
rˆIL ≡ ρ
p
rˆJL ≡ ρ
q
. (6)
To focus on the choice between IL and JL, we assume that the lender is
always able to at least break even under an IL contract. We define a maximum
value for U , U¯ such that IC1 binds at the zero-profit rate rˆIL (and therefore
IC1 is satisfied at rˆJL since rˆJL < rˆIL).
Assumption 2 U ≤ U¯ ≡ ρ−δp2R
δp(1−δ) .
If U > U¯ , both lender types offer JL when JL at least breaks even, and
shut down if it does not, so there is no variation in contracts offered.
Substituting for rˆIL and rˆJL, inspection of (1) and (2) reveals that Vˆ JL >
Vˆ IL. When the JL contract is incentive-compatible, borrowers are able to
repay more frequently, lowering their interest rate and increasing their contract
renewal probability. Therefore, the lender will always offer JL provided IC2
is satisfied at rˆJL. This can be written as ρ ≤ qmin{rIC1(U), rIC2(U, S)} or,
since we know IC1 holds,
S ≥ max
{
0,
(2− δq)ρ− δq[pR− (1− δ)U ]
δq(1− δq)
}
≡ Sˆ(U). (7)
If S < Sˆ, IL is offered.21 Given Assumption 2, a sufficient condition for Sˆ < 0
21Note that Assumption 2 implies Sˆ(U) < S¯(U).
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is that JL is always more profitable than IL:
p < δq. (8)
Our first result relates the non-profit’s use of JL to the level of competition.
Increasing competition is captured by an increase in the borrower’s outside
option, U . If she defaults on a loan from her current lender, she can go on to
obtain a loan elsewhere. This tightens both IC1 and IC2, since the maximum
interest rate at which repayment is incentive compatible under either contract
decreases.
Proposition 1 Sˆ ′(U) > 0. In other words, the minimum amount of social
capital needed for JL to break even is increasing in the level of competition.
Thus, competition reduces joint liability lending by non-profits.
Competition improves the borrower’s outside option, reducing the cost of
losing her existing contract. As a result, for a given interest rate the minimum
level of social capital for a borrower to be willing to repay her partner’s loan
is increasing in competition.
3.2 For-profit lender
The for-profit lender, unsurprisingly, maximizes profits. Since he can always
costlessly replace a terminated borrower next period, he does not discount fu-
ture profits from a given borrower, instead maximizing only per-period profit
Π = pir˜−ρ. We denote equilibrium quantities under for-profit lending by a tilde
(x˜). Profits are maximized at the maximum incentive-compatible interest rate,
which under IL is r˜IL(U) = rIC1(U). Under JL the maximum rate is the min-
imum of rIC1(U) and rIC2(U, S), so r˜JL(U, S) = min{rIC1(U), rIC2(U, S)}.22
22If the lender sets the JL interest rate higher than rIC2(U, S), then the borrowers repay
only when both are successful, with probability p2, and he cannot earn more than under IL.
If he sets r > rIC1(U, S) the borrowers always default.
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The lender offers JL when qr˜JL(U, S) > pr˜IL(U), or
S ≥ max
{
0,
p(p− δq)[pR− (1− δ)U ]
q(1− δq)
}
≡ S˜(U).
Condition (8) is now necessary and sufficient for the lender to always offer
JL. It is easy to check that S˜(U) ≥ Sˆ(U), and hence the for-profit is always
(weakly) less likely to offer JL than the non-profit.
Proposition 2 For a given level of competition, U , a non-profit lender is
more likely to offer JL than a for-profit: S˜(U) ≥ Sˆ(U).
The intuition for the proposition is straightforward. The non-profit offers
JL whenever it breaks even, because JL maximizes borrower welfare. The
for-profit also requires JL to break even, but additionally it must be more
profitable than IL. Since this is a stricter condition, the for-profit ends up
offering JL to fewer borrowers. It is easily verified that the expressions for Sˆ
and S˜ coincide at U = U¯ , i.e. when U is so high that IL is just breaking even.
We have assumed that the for-profit is myopic, ignoring the impact on
future profits of retaining a borrower for longer. The motivation for this as-
sumption is that lenders have limited capacity relative to demand, so the lender
can easily replace a defaulting borrower next period. However, it is easy to see
that the result also holds for a patient for-profit, who discounts the future with
discount factor β ∈ [0, 1]. Now the net present value of profits from a given
borrower are pir˜−ρ
1−βpi . The non-profit offers JL provided it is possible to break
even with a JL contract, which is equivalent to checking qr˜JL(U, S) − ρ ≥ 0.
The for-profit offers JL whenever it is more profitable than IL, i.e. when
qr˜JL(U,S)
1−βq ≥ max
{
0, pr˜
IL(U)−ρ
1−δp
}
, which is a more restrictive condition for all β.
Next we consider the impact of competition on the for-profit’s use of JL.
Proposition 3 For-profit lenders become more likely to offer JL as competi-
tion increases: S˜ ′(U) < 0.
The result follows from the fact that revenue under JL is less sensitive to
U than under IL. Under IL the relevant incentive constraint (IC1) determines
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the maximum single payment the borrower is willing to make, δ(V − U) =
r, so increases in U are passed through to decreases in r. Under JL, the
relevant incentive constraint (IC2) determines the maximum double payment
the borrower will make, δ(V − U + S) = 2r, so for a given decrease in the
left-hand-side, the interest rate r falls by half as much.23 Therefore, profits
decrease faster under IL than JL, can make JL more profitable when U is
sufficiently high.
Collecting results, we see that competition decreases JL usage by non-
profits. Conversion to for-profit also decreases JL usage, but competition
increases JL usage by for-profits. Finally, an observation:
Observation 1 For a given level of social capital, S, an increase in U cannot
induce both the non-profit to switch from JL to IL and the for-profit to switch
from IL to JL.
The observation follows formally from Proposition 2, which shows that
for profits always have a higher threshold than non-profits for offering JL.
Intuitively, if the non-profit switches to IL it is because JL can no longer
break even, thus the for-profit will not switch to JL.
3.3 Joint liability over time
Now we use the assumed heterogeneity of S in the population to study changes
in the aggregate level of IL and JL lending. We first derive the steady state
share of borrowers receiving IL loans for a given share of for-profit lenders
in the market, which we denote by f , and a given level of the borrowers’
outside option U . Then we analyze comparative statics on these variables.
We deliberately take f and U as exogenous since these are our measures of
commercialization that we will attempt to study in the data.
We assume that lenders are atomistic with a fixed capacity of two borrow-
ers per period, enabling them to each serve either two IL borrowers or one JL
23Note that V also depends on both U and r, with different slopes under IL and JL,
complicating the relation between U and r. Inspection of rIC1 and rIC2 reveals that
drIC1(U)
dU
drIC2(U,S)
dU
= 12−δq ∈ (0.5, 1).
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group. At the end of each period, lenders terminate all defaulting IL borrowers
or JL groups. We then make two technical assumptions for simplicity. First,
because IL defaults can leave lenders with a single vacancy, we assume that
surviving IL borrowers are reshuﬄed to fill vacancies in other equivalent IL
branches. This ensures that (with the exception of a zero measure of “remain-
der” borrowers when there is an odd number of defaults) branches either have
two or zero vacancies at the beginning of the next period, and can therefore
freely offer IL or JL. Second, a borrower whose contract is terminated rejoins
the pool of unmatched borrowers and draws a new potential borrowing partner
and value of S from F . This ensures that S is always distributed according to
F in the pool. Atomistic lenders imply that borrowers’ histories do not matter
since they will never re-match with a previous lender.
Borrowers without a current loan contract receive utility U . At the begin-
ning of a period, branches with vacant spaces fill them by drawing a pair of
borrowers at random from the pool of unmatched borrowers. They observe the
pair’s value of S, and offer them either an IL or JL contract which determines
their value for V . Non-profits offer IL when S < Sˆ(U), and for-profits offer
IL when S < S˜(U), i.e. with probability F (S˜(U)). If a borrower rejects, she
goes back to the pool until next period. Since the lender will always offer a
contract such that V > U (otherwise the incentive conditions are violated),
borrowers always accept.
Denote by ηˆ(U) (η˜(U)) the steady-state fraction of non-profit (for-profit)
lenders offering IL. When filling a vacancy at a non-profit (for-profit) lender, a
borrower receives an IL contracts with probability F (Sˆ(U)) (F (S˜(U))), since
we assumed she her value of S was drawn anew from F . However, IL and
JL borrowers default and re-enter the pool at different rates (1− p, and 1− q
respectively), so JL groups survive for longer. As a result in steady state, where
the flows into and out of IL/JL are equalized, the fraction of IL borrowers will
be smaller than F (S) and the fraction of JL borrowers larger than 1− F (S).
Solving for the steady states, we obtain ηˆ(U) = F (Sˆ(U))(1−p)
1−F (Sˆ(U))p < F (Sˆ(U)) and
η˜(U) = F (S˜(U))(1−p)
1−F (S˜(U))p < F (S˜(U)). The steady state JL shares are 1 − ηˆ(U) =
1−F (Sˆ(U))
1−F (Sˆ(U))p and 1− η˜(U) =
1−F (S˜(U))
1−F (S˜(U))p . Derivations are given in the Appendix.
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With these objects in hand, the steady state IL share in the market is
η(U) = fη˜(U) + (1 − f)ηˆ(U). How does the IL share change over time? It
depends on the change in U and the change in f . We can write it as:
dη
dt
=
df
dt
[η˜(U)− ηˆ(U)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
dU
dt
(1− p)
f F ′(S˜(U))S˜ ′(U)(1− pF (S˜(U)))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+(1− f) F
′(Sˆ(U))Sˆ ′(U)
(1− pF (Sˆ(U)))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
 .
An increase in the share of for-profits increases the share of IL lending, as
for-profits demand more social capital to offer JL. The effect of an increase
in the borrowers’ outside option (for example, because of an increase in com-
petitiveness) is ambiguous, as it increases IL lending by non-profits and JL
lending by for-profits. However when the initial share of for-profits is low (f
close to zero), the effect of increasing U will also be to increase η.
Observation 2 Provided the initial share of for-profits in the market is suffi-
ciently low, concurrent growth in for-profit lending and competition lead to an
overall increase in IL lending.
3.4 Endogenizing U
Ideally, we would like to endogenize U as a function of the scale of lending rela-
tive to the borrower population (since this determines how long an unmatched
borrower must wait for a loan) and the share of for-profits (since for-profits
charge higher interest rates and so are a less attractive outside option). It
is straightforward to do so in competitive equilibrium with homogeneous S
(i.e. F is degenerate), and we do so in de Quidt, Fetzer and Ghatak (2016) in
order to make statements about aggregate welfare. When S is homogeneous
a given lender type (non-profit/for-profit) either offers only IL or JL loans. In
competitive equilibrium the lender’s motivation does not matter: there is just
one feasible contract that breaks even. We show that the level of social capital
19
required for the competitive market to offer JL is higher than a monopolist
non-profit, and lower than a monopolist for-profit. In other words, transition
from an uncompetitive, not-for-profit industry to a competitive one increases
the likelihood that IL is used.
However, the model in this paper necessarily focuses on behavior out of
competitive (i.e. zero-profit) equilibrium, to analyze the effect of changing
lender motivation and market competitiveness on the contracts offered. Solv-
ing for the equilibrium value of U and deriving comparative statics is much
more complex in this setting. For this reason, we use our “reduced form” anal-
ysis which takes U as given to motivate the below empirical work, in which
we test the model’s three main predictions: that for-profits are more likely to
use IL, that increasing competitiveness increases IL use by non-profits, and
decreases it by for-profits. Appendix B.2 outlines the procedure for deriving
an implicit function the equilibrium value of U when U is assumed to capture
only the possibility of obtaining a loan from a competitor lender in future.
3.5 Ex-ante competition
So far we have modeled the effects of competition only through the borrower’s
outside option upon default, i.e. competition is ex-post, only affecting behavior
after the contract is accepted. This is natural because we assumed throughout
that credit is scarce relative to the number of potential borrowers, such that
lenders have market power in setting prices but must pay attention to bor-
rowers’ ex-post incentive to repay. However the model does allow us to think
in a simple way about ex-ante competition, whereby increased competition
constrains the prices lenders can charge or face losing their clients.
There are three natural ways to model ex-ante competition. The first is
that competition acts as a simple cap on the interest rate that lenders can
charge under either contract, r ≤ r¯. This has no effect on the contract offering
of non-profits, but may cause them to shut down entirely, while it predicts that
for-profits increase their use of JL, as in Proposition 3. Non-profits already
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earn zero profits, so if the cap is binding they must shut down.24 For-profits
offer the profit maximizing contract, and charge higher interest rates under
IL than JL. Therefore, the cap binds first on IL, reducing its profitability and
increasing the attractiveness of JL. If it binds on both contracts, the lender
will offer JL for sure since the interest rates are equalized but the repayment
rate is higher under JL.
Second, ex-ante competition might manifest as a floor on borrower welfare
that the contract must meet or exceed. Call this value V . Since the non-profit
maximizes borrower welfare, once again this constraint either has no effect or
puts it out of business. Turning to the for-profits, we require V˜ IL ≥ V and
V˜ JL ≥ V . Using expressions (1) and (2), we obtain the implied bounds on
revenue under IL and JL:
Revenue
IL
= prIL ≤ pR + δ(1− p)U − (1− δp)V
Revenue
JL
= qrJL ≤ pR + δ(1− q)U − (1− δq)V .
Taking the difference, we obtain RevenueJL−RevenueIL = δp(1−p)(V −U).
Noting that IC1 requires V > U , so the constraint can only bind when V > U ,
we learn that the constraint is tighter on IL revenue than JL revenue, and
therefore, to the extent that it is binding, will also push the lender toward
offering JL, again in line with Proposition 3.
Finally, we could conceptualize ex-ante competition as putting an upper
bound on profits, i.e. Π = pir−ρ ≤ Π¯. Assuming Π¯ ≥ 0, for the non-profit this
is never binding, since it earns zero profits, so once again there is no effect.
For the for-profit it either has no effect or makes it indifferent between the
contracts. It maximizes profits, pir − ρ, so this constraint only affects the
profitability of the most profitable contract, not their (strict) ordering.
We sum up the findings with the following observation:
Observation 3 Ex-ante competition that increases with commercialization
24Notably, the cap doesn’t induce switching between contract types. If they were offering
IL before the cap we know that JL is not profitable, while because IL rates are higher, if
the cap is binding on JL it already rendered IL unprofitable.
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weakly reinforces the qualitative predictions of our main theory. The non-
profit’s contract choices are unaffected, while the for-profit is either unaffected
or increases his use of JL in line with Proposition 3.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data
The dataset we work with come from MIXMarket.org (henceforth MIX), an
organization that collects, validates and publishes financial performance data
of MFIs around the world. The MIX is the largest and most comprehensive
source of data on microfinance institutions. For example, in 2011, 1,375 MFIs
reported data on loan portfolio value and loans outstanding to the MIX. Their
combined gross loan portfolio had a value of USD 71.5 billion across 151 million
loans. Our estimating sample contains financial data for 1,000 MFIs, which
provide some lending methodology data across a total of 3,479 observations,
for the period from 2008 to 2011.25 Our focus in this paper is to highlight
trends in lending methodology. The MIX is the only data source of which
we are aware that has collected this data systematically over time. Lending
methodology, according to the MIX, is categorized into three categories: In-
dividual, Solidarity Group and Village Banking/Self Help Group. The MIX
is not explicit about whether joint liability is used; its definition reads “loans
are considered to be of the Solidarity Group methodology when some aspect
of loan consideration depends on the group, including credit analysis, liability,
guarantee, collateral, and loan size and conditions.” We follow other authors
in treating such loans as JL. We also classify village-banking/self help groups
as JL lending, though this is not important for our results.26 Using these data
we construct MFI-level IL portfolio shares, “IL shares.”
25This is a significant subset of the 1,932 MFIs that report a total of 5,219 observations
to the MIX in this four year period.
26Self-help groups are particularly common in India. Typically they take the form of small
groups organized by an NGO, who take joint loans from a bank and distribute them among
their members.
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Lending methodology information is provided by MFIs in the Gross Loan
Portfolio report and/or in the Number of Loans Outstanding report. In the
paper we mostly focus on regressions based on the fraction of the number of
loans under IL lending, and provide the (very similar) results based on the
fraction of the gross loan portfolio in the appendix.
The main weakness of the MIX data is selection: the MFIs who report
methodology data may not be representative of the population of MFIs, either
because of missing observations (an MFI does not report in a given year) or
missing variables (the MFI does not report one of our key measures in a given
year). Because of these concerns, we work throughout with different sources of
“within” variation (within region, country, MFI), based on two panel sampling
frames. We study a “strongly balanced” panel of 348 (340), which report
lending method by number of loans (gross loan portfolio) for all four years.
We also present results from a “weakly balanced” panel of 878 (831), who report
lending methodology by number of loans (gross loan portfolio) at least twice.27
Because of the potentially non-representative sample we are less interested in
the raw levels of IL/JL in our sample, instead focusing on changes. We must
simply assume for external validity that (at least qualitatively) any trends or
comparative statics we observe net of the relevant controls and fixed effects
would also be observed in the population.
In view of selection concerns, we note that the MFIs that report lend-
ing methodology comprise a significant share of all loans in the MIX market
dataset. The strongly balanced panels accounts between 24.7-34.4 percent of
all loans in a given year (24.4-32.5 percent of all lending by Gross Loan Portfo-
lio), while the weakly balanced panels account for between 52.0 -78.1 percent
of all loans (50.8.7-71.4 percent of Gross Loan Portfolio). We are able to check
whether our two panel datasets appear representative of the full dataset of
27In addition, sometimes there are discrepancies in the data. For example, the number of
loans reported by each lending methodology might not add up to the total number of loans
outstanding. We assume that such errors are not systematically over- or under-reporting
the IL share, so for example an MFI reporting 100 IL and 100 JL loans but a total portfolio
of 250, would be coded as 50 percent IL. Our results are robust to dropping observations
with discrepancies.
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MFIs. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample, the weakly bal-
anced and the strongly balanced sample.28 We perform t-tests to compare the
means of key observables between the MFIs included in the refined samples,
and those excluded. Overall the two panel datasets look fairly representative
of the full dataset, in particular on our key IL share and profit status variables,
though we do find significant differences in some other variables.
For-profit/non-profit status (“profit status”) is recorded as a static variable,
reported in the 2011 data snapshot. One concern might be that MFIs have
changed status over time without us knowing. We do have data on transitions
of legal status and legal status and profit status are very tightly related. Most
(84 percent) non-profit MFIs have either Credit Union/Cooperative or NGO
as legal status (see Appendix Table 4). In our sample period, out of the 1,000
MFIs, only 13 have changed their legal status. Out of those, 7 transitions
were from NGO to Non-Bank Financial Institution, mostly associated with
for-profits. The low frequency of legal status changes suggests that profit
status changes are unlikely to endanger our results, and removing institutions
that changed legal status does not change our results.
We use three proxies for the extent of credit market competition which en-
ters the borrowers’ outside options, U in the model.29 These data come from
the Financial Access Survey collected by the International Monetary Fund.
They have been used in the past to study outreach of the financial sector,
for example, by Beck (2007), Ahlin, Lin and Maio (2011), Levine (2005), and
Čihák et al. (2013). They are incorporated in the World Development Indi-
cators. We mostly focus on the variable measuring the number of commercial
bank branches per million people; in addition, we obtain similar results using
28This table includes MFIs reporting IL shares by number of loans. Table 5 reports the
equivalent figures for the sample defined by GLP IL share data. Because not every MFI is
observed every year, we report the 2009 values where available (since 2009 has the greatest
data availability), otherwise we take the closest available datapoint (averaging 2008 and
2010 when both are available).
29An obvious alternative to the proxy variables would be to try to construct competition
measures from the MIX data, e.g. computing concentration indices. We do not pursue this
because such measures are highly sensitive to the selection issues discussed above, and we
suspect most of the cross- and within-country variation would be spurious.
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two other indicators of financial development: the density of ATMs per million
people and the overall measure of domestic credit provided by the financial
sector as a share of GDP. We exploit the differential effect of changes in these
measures of financial development on the choice of lending methodology by
MFIs. In our regressions, we standardize these variables to mean zero, stan-
dard deviation one, to ease interpretation and comparison of their coefficients.
Our country-level observables are summarized in Table 2.
4.2 Empirical Specification
We test three predictions of the model, that (1) non-profits use JL relatively
more than for-profits; (2) that competition increases JL use by for-profits via a
general equilibrium effect; and (3) competition decreases JL use by non-profits.
To test these predictions, we estimate the following main specification:
ILicrt = αNPi + η Cct + γNPi × Cct +X′ictβ + aicr + bt + icrt. (9)
Here, ILicrt measures the share of individual liability loans, measured either
based on Number of Loans or based on the Gross Loan Portfolio of an MFI
i in country c, region r, and year t. NPi is an indicator variable for whether
MFI i is a non-profit, while Cct is a country-year level measure of competition.
aicr is an MFI, country, or region fixed effect, and bt is a year fixed effect.
For robustness checks, we also control for further covariates that vary at the
country level or the MFI level and are included in Xict; these are discussed
further below.
Mapping the tested predictions into parameter estimates: (1) non-profits
have lower IL shares (α < 0); (2) competition decreases the use of IL by
for-profits (η < 0); (3) competition increases the use of IL by non-profits
(η + γ > 0). We additionally test whether the effect of competition on non-
profit IL shares is more positive than on for-profits (γ > 0).
We exploit variation at two levels. First, we exploit variation across MFIs
within a region or country in order to estimate the coefficient α, since the non-
profit indicator does not vary within MFI. For these specifications, we control
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for region or country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Secondly, we exploit
variation within MFIs over time, in order to more cleanly identify how changes
in competition Cct affect for-profit MFIs differently from non-profit MFIs. In
these specifications we cannot estimate α for obvious reasons.
4.3 Main Results
The main results are presented in Table 3. We present results for both the
strongly and weakly balanced panels, and for both measures of IL share.
The results support the model. Each of the three coefficient sign predictions
consistently holds across specifications, though not all point estimates are
statistically significantly different from zero. On average, we estimate that
non-profits have lower IL shares, and this coefficient is quite stable across
specifications (around 10–20 percentage points). An increase in bank branch
density induces for-profits to lower their IL share (these point estimates vary,
from 1.7 to 10.0 percentage points per one standard deviation change in bank
branch density), while non-profits raise theirs (all but one coefficient positive,
ranging from -0.5 to +4 percentage points per standard deviation change).
The main concerns with this empirical analysis fall into three categories.
First, the expansion of commercial bank branches may just capture some other
macroeconomic trends which are non-causally correlated with changes in lend-
ing methodology. Second, the expansion of commercial bank branches may be
a poor proxy for competition. Third, non-profit status or our competition
measures could be confounded with other MFI-level characteristics (though
this is somewhat addressed by our fixed effects strategy). We will address
each of these concerns in turn.
4.3.1 Robustness to additional controls
An obvious concern with our identification strategy is that we proxy for com-
petition with country-level variables that may capture other within-region dif-
ferences or within-country trends. For example, if individual loans are difficult
to administer in rural areas, differences in urbanization might be driving the
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effects we see. Or perhaps the shift towards IL lending reflects the growth of
mobile banking, which can substitute for the transaction cost-lowering bene-
fits of group lending. Lastly, as our sample period covers the period following
the financial crisis, we may be concerned about the regulatory changes, which
may have affected MFIs differentially.
We perform several checks. First, we interact the non-profit indicator with
additional country level covariates (also taken from the World Development
Indicators) to highlight the extent to which these concerns apply.30
Results are presented in Appendix Tables 6 and 7. The signs, magnitudes
and the precision of our main coefficients are highly robust, and if anything
the results are somewhat strengthened.
Appendix Table 8 checks robustness to inclusion of further control variables
that vary at the country and MFI level. We control for non-linear country-
specific trends (using country-year fixed effects). This of course precludes
estimation of the direct effect of the competition proxies (so we cannot test
η < 0 or η + γ > 0), but we can still exploit within-country variation to ana-
lyze the differences in behavior of non-profits and for-profits, testing whether
α < 0 and γ > 0. We also control for some MFI-level indicators (and/or fixed
effects): a static measure capturing the MIX Market’s assessment of the sus-
tainability of an MFI’s operations (“Diamonds”), and time-varying measures
(namely, Capital to Asset Ratio, Debt to equity ratio, Average loan balance per
borrower, Return on assets, Financial revenue/Assets, Yield on gross portfolio,
Financial expense/assets ratio, and Operating expense/assets ratio). We lose
some observations as not all variables are available for all MFIs. The coeffi-
cients remain stable relative to the main specifications, consistently estimating
a lower IL share for non-profits and a more positive effect of competition on
IL lending by non-profits than for-profits.
While our model abstracts from loan size, for a given level of social capital
S, growth in loan sizes (perhaps driven by income growth) also predicts a
shift toward IL. This is because the larger the loan, the more social capital
30We include the urban population share, mobile phones per 100 people, GDP per capita,
agriculture/industry shares in GDP, and foreign aid.
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is required for a JL borrower to be willing to assist her partner, making low
social capital JL groups no longer viable. It is therefore encouraging that our
coefficient estimates are robust to inclusion of controls for GDP and loan size,
because this gives confidence that the trend we observe is not simply capturing
by other changes in lending behavior.
4.3.2 Robustness to other proxies for competition
In this section, we show that our results are robust to using two other proxy
variables for the extent of competition. Results can be found in Appendix Ta-
bles 9 and 10. First, we focus on the density of ATMs (measured per million
inhabitants, then standardized by us). This measure has been previously used
as a proxy variable for financial access in the literature. As with the bank
branch density, we believe this is a variable that is correlated with borrowers’
outside option at a given MFI, while not directly measuring competition be-
tween MFIs. The coefficient pattern is very similar to our previous results,
though the point estimates are less precise, see Appendix Table 9.
Our third proxy variable is commonly referred to as Financial Depth and
measures the overall size of the domestic credit market: the share of loans given
by domestic financial institutions relative to GDP. The pattern of coefficients is
again similar to our baseline results using this alternative proxy of competition.
While some of the point estimates are implausibly large, it is to be noted that
by imposing linearity our specification permits estimates of changes in portfolio
shares that exceed 100 percent.
Overall, the evidence is broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions.
4.3.3 Regulation shocks
One concern is that the patterns we observe might be driven by regulatory
changes during our sample period which happen to correlate with our proxy
variables. We attempt to address such concerns in Appendix Table 13.
First, we drop India from the main regression specification. India is an
important country for microfinance, as it has given rise, over just a short time
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period, to some of the biggest institutions. However, over our sample period
it experienced a major repayment crisis (in the state of Andhra Pradesh),
which triggered regulatory changes in that state (essentially shutting down
the industry) as well as leading the drafting of the “Microfinance Bill,” which
is presently in the pipeline through the Parliamentary process.31 Our results,
if anything, are stronger when India is dropped.
In a further specification we control flexibly for time-varying regulatory
shocks, using Region by Legal Status by Year fixed effects (legal status and
for-profit status are correlated but not collinear). Under the assumption that
regulation varies according to legal status and not profit status, this specifica-
tion controls for time-varying regulatory shifts, albeit at the regional and not
country level. Our results, if anything, get stronger.
5 Conclusion
While it often claimed that joint liability is in decline, there is little analysis
beyond some allusions to JL being inconvenient for borrowers, who dislike
having their social capital leveraged in this way. For this taste-based argument
to have bite in explaining the trend, there must be a change in tastes over time,
which is very difficult to test (in particular because we are aware of no dataset
that even attempts to measure such preferences).
We show that even with stable tastes, commercialization predicts the de-
cline. Our paper is the first rigorous attempt to examine the trend empirically,
and to analyze its cause. We show that MFIs do indeed appear to be reducing
the share of JL in their portfolios, albeit over a short panel. We argue theoret-
ically that a key mechanism underlying the decline of JL is commercialization:
a hand-in-hand increase in competition alongside a shift from non-profit to
for-profit lending, and show that both trends are present in the data. Finally,
we test the model under a variety of sampling frames and with an increas-
ingly stringent set of fixed effects and controls. Overall, we find the data are
largely qualitatively consistent with the theory: non-profits do use JL more
31See de Quidt, Fetzer and Ghatak (2012) for further background.
29
than for-profits; competition increases the use of JL by for-profits and (in
most specifications) reduces its use by non-profits. Unfortunately, though we
use the best-available data, they are imperfect. In particular we do not
have a fully balanced and representative panel and our competition measures
are proxies rather than direct measures and so we avoid making quantitative
claims based on our results. Also, while we control for a number of observ-
ables and fixed effects, in the absence of a natural experiment, we do not
have a way of causally identifying the effect of changes in market structure on
the switch from JL to IL. We hope our analysis can be complemented with
more micro-level evidence that can test some of the mechanisms highlighted
in the paper.
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6 Tables and figures
Table 1: MFI Characteristics for MFIs reporting IL share by Number of Loans
Full Sample Weakly Balanced Strongly Balanced
Mean N Mean N p Mean N p
IL Share by Number of Loans 0.60 1538.00 0.58 932.00 0.35 0.58 378.00 0.72
IL Share by Loan Value 0.64 1476.00 0.64 894.00 0.87 0.64 365.00 0.99
Non Profit 0.60 1408.00 0.60 932.00 0.94 0.66 378.00 0.19
Non-Regulated 0.33 1768.00 0.39 932.00 <0.01 0.46 378.00 <0.01
NGO 0.32 1898.00 0.36 932.00 0.01 0.44 378.00 <0.01
Portfolio at Risk 90 days 6.43 1732.00 5.71 930.00 0.26 4.86 378.00 <0.01
Return on Assets -0.25 1657.00 0.62 930.00 <0.01 1.56 378.00 0.01
Profit Margin -4.88 1741.00 0.45 931.00 <0.01 4.85 378.00 <0.01
MFI Risk Rating (1-5) 2.65 1920.00 2.95 932.00 <0.01 3.57 378.00 <0.01
Capital to Asset Ratio 36.77 1813.00 31.90 931.00 0.11 29.98 378.00 0.78
Debt to Equity Ratio 8.47 1772.00 4.84 931.00 0.16 7.10 378.00 0.08
Average Loan Balance 6405.76 1906.00 1448.17 932.00 0.66 1273.97 378.00 0.20
Cost per Borrower 304.37 1514.00 241.57 923.00 0.10 197.31 378.00 <0.01
Write Offs/ Assets 2.36 1623.00 2.21 929.00 0.31 2.21 378.00 0.58
Notes: Comparison of sample means across different samples used in the main table. Weakly balanced refers to MFIs
reporting lending method by number of loans at least twice from 2008 - 2011, while strongly balanced only includes
MFIs that report data on lending method by number of loans in each year between 2008-2011. We report the 2009
values where available (since 2009 has the greatest data availability), otherwise we take the closest available datapoint
(averaging 2008 and 2010 when both are available). The number of MFIs changes as not all institutions report data
on all the characteristics explored. “Mean” reports the average of the characteristic, “N” reports the number of MFIs
included in the sample, while “p-value” reports the significance of the difference in means between the respective
sample and the remainder of the full sample.
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Table 2: Country characteristics
Full Sample Weakly Balanced Strongly Balanced
Mean N Mean N p Mean N p
Urban population share 0.47 113.00 0.47 100.00 0.57 0.51 64.00 0.03
Mobile Phones/100 people 74.16 112.00 73.13 99.00 0.39 82.21 63.00 0.01
Agriculture share in GDP 18.18 103.00 18.52 92.00 0.63 15.64 61.00 0.02
Industrial sector share in GDP 29.06 103.00 28.27 92.00 0.27 28.93 61.00 0.97
Service sector share in GDP 53.21 104.00 53.71 93.00 0.25 56.14 62.00 <0.01
Development Aid as share of GDP 6.72 107.00 6.19 95.00 0.51 5.31 61.00 0.17
GDP Growth Rate 3.87 111.00 3.99 98.00 0.17 3.82 64.00 0.99
GDP per capita 3.68 111.00 3.33 98.00 0.06 3.78 64.00 0.72
Domestic Credit / GDP 4.52 105.00 4.34 93.00 0.60 4.70 61.00 0.37
Commercial bank density 1.30 112.00 1.29 100.00 0.82 1.65 64.00 <0.01
ATM Density 2.26 110.00 2.16 98.00 0.21 2.61 63.00 0.07
Notes: “Full sample” contains country-level characteristics for the countries represented in the full MIX sample,
while “weakly balanced” and “strongly balanced” restrict to the countries that appear in the respective panels (the
“number of loans” samples). We report unweighted averages, i.e. each country is given equal weight irrespective
of the number or scale of MFIs in that country. We report 2009 values where available, otherwise we take the
closest available datapoint (averaging 2008 and 2010 when both are available). The number of countries changes
as not all countries have data for all characteristics. “Mean” reports the average of the characteristic, “N” reports
the number of countries included in the sample, while “p-value” reports the significance of the difference in means
between the respective sample and the remainder of the full sample.
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Table 3: Non Profit Status, Competition and IL Lending
Panel A: IL Share by Number of Loans
Strongly Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Commercial bank density -0.059 -0.088* -0.023 -0.058 -0.047 -0.021
(0.065) (0.052) (0.017) (0.036) (0.029) (0.014)
Non Profit -0.139** -0.179** -0.098* -0.169***
(0.059) (0.077) (0.050) (0.046)
Non-Profit x Bank Branch Density 0.067 0.113* 0.031 0.069** 0.067** 0.024*
(0.052) (0.060) (0.020) (0.029) (0.033) (0.014)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? .008 .024* .008 .011 .02** .003
(.0415) (.0132) (.0116) (.0253) (.00864) (.00621)
MFIs 348 348 348 878 878 878
Countries 64 64 64 94 94 94
Observations 1392 1392 1392 2756 2756 2756
Panel B : IL Share by Gross Loan Portfolio
Strongly Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Commercial bank density -0.090 -0.100** -0.017 -0.075** -0.066** -0.018
(0.064) (0.043) (0.012) (0.033) (0.026) (0.011)
Non Profit -0.151*** -0.182*** -0.119*** -0.170***
(0.051) (0.062) (0.043) (0.041)
Non-Profit x Bank Branch Density 0.086* 0.140** 0.032 0.080*** 0.092*** 0.029
(0.049) (0.054) (0.023) (0.028) (0.032) (0.018)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? -.005 .04** .015 .005 .026** .011
(.04) (.0156) (.017) (.024) (.0122) (.0116)
MFIs 340 340 340 831 831 831
Countries 60 60 60 92 92 92
Observations 1360 1360 1360 2605 2605 2605
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of individual liability loans provided by an MFI as measured by Number
of Loans (Panel A) or by Value of Loan Portfolio (Panel B). Strongly balanced refers to a balanced dataset for which
lending methodology data is available for the period 2008-2011, while weakly balanced includes only MFIs that report this
information at least twice. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level, with stars indicating ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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A Data Appendix
We combine three different data sets from the MIX Market and data from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. This note will outline the
process by which we combine these different data sources to arrive at the data
set we use in our paper.
Global Data Download The MIX provides a global data download of basic
portfolio information that is constantly updated. This data can be down-
loaded from http://www.mixmarket.org/crossmarket-analysis-report/
download. This contains basic profile information, such as the MFI name,
the respective MIX Market identification number, Profit status, Legal status
as well as the basic portfolio report, detailing the Number of Loans Outstand-
ing, Portfolio At Risk and other measures of performance that vary at the
MFI level over time. We drop MFIs for which the Profit Status information is
missing. We match the various financial years to the nearest calendar years.
Unfortunately this comprehensive data download does not provide a detailed
breakdown of lending methodology.
Further, we map the country names into 16 world regions: Central Africa,
Central America, Central Asia, East Asia, Eastern Africa, Indian Ocean,
Northern Africa, Northern Asia, South America, South Asia, South East Asia,
South East Europe, South West Asia, Southern Africa, West Indies, Western
1
Africa. This region definition is finer than the one used by the MIX market,
which only distinguishes continent.
This is our basic MFI-level panel, which we augment with auxiliary data
obtained from detailed portfolio reports to obtain information about lending
methodology.
Detailed Portfolio Reports For every MFI, a detailed portfolio report
can be constructed through the MIX Market’s reporting facility. We down-
loaded this information in July 2014. We proceed as follows. We take all
the MFI names contained in the global data download, and download each
MFI’s detailed portfolio report individually. For example, for the MFI “Brac”,
this data is available from http://reports.mixmarket.org/mfi/brac. We
collect methodology data from the Balance Sheet and/or the Products and
Clients report and then match to the data from the Global Data Download.
We use this information to construct the share of IL lending. Lending method-
ology is reported across three categories: individual, solidarity group or village
banking/self help group.
We assign an MFI as reporting lending methodology by number of loans if
any of these lending method numbers is non missing or non-zero. For exam-
ple, if an MFI reports zero individual, zero solidarity group and zero village
banking/self help group loans, then we would record this MFI as having miss-
ing lending methodology data. If the MFI reports a strictly positive number
of loans in any of these categories then we code the MFI as reporting lend-
ing methodology. We compute the share of IL loans as simply the number
of individual divided by the total of individual, solidarity group and village
banking/self help group loans. We proceed similarly in the construction of the
share of individual liability loans as measured by the loan portfolio value. Our
weakly balanced panel includes on MFIs that report data on lending method-
ology at least twice between 2008 and 2011, while our strongly balanced panel
includes those that report in all four years.
For village banks the lending method is less clear than for pure individual
liability lenders. Our main analysis treats them as JL lenders. In a robustness
2
check, regression Table 11 exclude all MFIs that, at some point, reported
positive village lending.
In some cases, the total sum of individual, solidarity group and village
banking/self help group loans does not add up to the total number of loans
outstanding. For three MFIs, we remove obvious errors that are due to data
entry, which resulted in dramatic discrepancies. Especially for IL shares mea-
sured by Gross Loan Portfolio, small discrepancies arise due to rounding errors.
In Table 11, we remove all MFI-year observations with any discrepancy for the
Panel A (IL Share measured by Number of Loans), while in Panel B, we re-
move all MFI-year observations where the discrepancy between the Gross Loan
Portfolio and the implied Gross Loan Portfolio when adding up the portfolio
by lending methods is larger than 10%.
Incorporation Date and Profit Status In order to construct the top left
panel of Figure 1, we obtain data on the incorporation dates of the MFIs.
Unfortunately, this information is not contained in the main data download.
We make use of an older data download which provides this information for
the set of MFIs that reported some data to the MIX market prior to Febru-
ary 2011. This data is available from http://www.mixmarket.org/sites/
default/files/mfi_profile_information_02.24.11.xls. We merge the
date established to the global data download to construct the share of for-
profit MFIs by incorporation dates. Obviously, this can only be constructed
for the set of MFIs for which we know the incorporation date, in order to
illustrate the global trend the figure also includes MFIs that do not disclose
data on lending methodology. The figure looks very similar when weighting
by MFI size in 2009 or by including e.g. only on the MFIs from the weakly
balanced sample.
In addition, the 2011 data snapshot provides us with an additional record
of the For-profit/non-profit status (“profit status”) as of February 2011. One
concern might be that some MFIs changed status prior to February 2011 (or
between February 2011 and the end of 2011). Since legal status and non profit
status are likely closely related (see Appendix Table 4), we remove MFIs that
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switched legal status during our sample period. The results are presented in
Table 11.
Competition Proxies Lastly, we obtain proxy variables for the extent of
competition from the development indicators. These can be obtained from the
World BankWebsite, available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
world-development-indicators.
We use these data as proxies for the borrowers’ outside options, the avail-
ability of alternative sources of credit. The top right Figure 1 plots the simple
cross-country averages over time (unbalanced, i.e. including countries that do
not have data for every year) in these measures for the set of countries that
appear in the full MIX dataset. Again, the trends look similar when focusing
only on the countries which are present in our weakly balanced sample.
A.1 Peru
Our main analysis excludes Peruvian MFIs. As discussed in footnote 4 it turns
out that the results are highly sensitive to inclusion of Peru, but not to any
other country. To demonstrate this, Figure 2 Panel A presents box plots of our
three main coefficient estimates,1 where we re-run the main Strongly Balanced
panel regression dropping each country in turn. In other words, we have one
set of point estimates for all countries excluding Nicaragua, one set excluding
Pakistan, etc. The main lesson is that the two point estimates related to bank
branch density are tightly distributed and close to zero whenever Peru is in-
cluded, then increase dramatically in magnitude when Peru is dropped. Put
the other way, including Peru shrinks the point estimates dramatically toward
zero. Peru is also a moderate outlier in the non-profit coefficient (this coef-
ficient is more sensitive to Nepal and India, which are also moderate outliers
for the other coefficients, but note that although we do not drop Nepal and
India, doing so would only strengthen our results).
1For “Commercial bank density” (competition effect on for-profits), “Commercial bank
density + Non-profit x Bank Branch Density” (competition effect on non-profits), and “Non
profit” (difference in IL share between non-profit and for-profit).
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Figure 2 Panel B then repeats the exercise, now excluding Peru, i.e. we
always drop Peru, then run the regressions dropping each other country in
turn. The results are not notably sensitive to any other country, and our
conclusions are not sensitive to their inclusion.
B Theory Appendix
B.1 Derivation of steady-state IL/JL shares
The non-profit IL share in period t is as follows:
ηˆt = ηˆt−1p+ ηˆt−1(1− p)F (Sˆ(U)) + (1− ηˆt−1)(1− q)F (Sˆ(U))
The first term on the right-hand side corresponds to the non-defaulting IL
borrowers (fraction p of the ηˆt−1 IL borrowers), who retain their IL contracts.
The second term corresponds to the vacancies at formerly IL branches which
are filled by new IL borrowers (fraction 1 − p of the ηˆt−1 borrowers default
creating vacancies, and then new borrowers are drawn of whom fraction F (Sˆ)
receive IL and 1 − F (Sˆ) receive JL). The third term corresponds to the va-
cancies at formerly JL branches which are now filled by IL borrowers (fraction
1 − q = (1 − p)2 JL borrowers default creating vacancies, and then new bor-
rowers are drawn of whom fraction F (Sˆ) receive IL and 1−F (Sˆ) receive JL).
Solving this equation for the steady state by setting ηˆt = ηˆt−1 we obtain:
ηˆ(U) =
F (Sˆ(U))(1− p)
1− F (Sˆ(U))p
The steady state JL share is equal to 1− ηˆ(U). The for-profit derivations are
identical.
B.2 Endogenizing U
We take the simplest case, where social capital is homogeneous and equal to S
for all borrowers. The population of borrowers has measure 2, but it is simpler
5
Panel A: Dropping each country in turn
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Panel B: Excluding Peru and dropping each country in turn
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Figure 2: Sensitivity of regression coefficients to inclusion of Peru (balanced
panel, IL share by number)
6
to work in terms of the measure of pairs of borrowers, which has measure
1. The measure of lenders is l < 1 (recall that each lender can serve two
borrowers, and that if l > 1 then all borrowers can guarantee they receive a
loan every period, so have no incentive to repay their current loan). Since
there is excess demand for credit, l borrower pairs are served each period.
Thus there are lf for-profits and l(1− f) non-profits.
Each period some borrowers default, leaving vacancies at their branches.
We allow for the possibility that some lenders offer IL and some offer JL, and
since borrowers are homogeneous we assume that their probability of receiving
a given contract equals their probability of matching to a lender offering that
contract. Thus lf η˜(U)(1−p) for-profit IL vacancies, lf(1− η˜)(1− q) for-profit
JL vacancies, l(1−f)ηˆ(U)(1−p) non-profit IL vacancies and l(1−f)(1−ηˆ)(1−q)
non-profit JL vacancies open each period. The total measure of unmatched
borrowers, which we define as D(U), is the number of defaulters last period
plus the excess demand, 1− l, equalling:
D(U) = 1− l + l[fη˜(U)(1− p) + (1− f)ηˆ(U)(1− p)
+ f(1− η˜(U))(1− q) + (1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))(1− q)].
Hence, an unmatched borrower can expect to receive:
U =
1
D(U)
[lf η˜(U)(1− p)V˜ IL(U, S) + l(1− f)ηˆ(U)(1− p)Vˆ IL(U)
+ lf(1− η˜(U))(1− q)V˜ JL(U) + l(1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))(1− q)Vˆ JL(U)
+ (1− l)δU ].
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Substituting for the V s (note, using (1− p)2 = (1− q)):
U =
1
D(U)
[
lf η˜(U)(1− p)pR− pr˜
IL(U)
1− δp + l(1− f)ηˆ(U)(1− p)
pR− ρ
1− δp
+ l (fη˜(U) + (1− f)ηˆ(U)) δ(1− q)U
1− δp
+ lf(1− η˜(U))(1− q)pR− qr˜
JL(U, S)
1− δq + l(1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))(1− q)
pR− ρ
1− δq
+ l [f(1− η˜(U)) + (1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))] δ(1− q)
2U
1− δq + (1− l)δU
]
.
Finally, substitute for the r˜s:
U =
1
D(U)
[
lf η˜(U)(1− p)pR + l(1− f)ηˆ(U)(1− p)pR− ρ
1− δp
+ lf η˜(U)(1− p)δ(1− δ)U
1− δp
+ l (fη˜(U) + (1− f)ηˆ(U)) δ(1− q)U
1− δp
+ lf(1− η˜(U))(1− q)pR− q
δpR+δ(1−δq)S
2−δq
1− δq + l(1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))(1− q)
pR− ρ
1− δq
+ lf(1− η˜(U))(1− q)q
δ(1−δ)
2−δq U
1− δq
+ l [f(1− η˜(U)) + (1− f)(1− ηˆ(U))] δ(1− q)
2U
1− δq + (1− l)δU
]
.
Clearly this remains a complex implicit function in U . An equilibrium
obtains at a fixed point whereby lenders do not want to change their contract
offerings given the value of U . We do not proceed with an in-depth analysis,
but we note that there at least exist all-IL (η˜ = ηˆ = 1) and all-JL (η˜ =
ηˆ = 0) equilibria. This follows from the analysis of competitive equilibrium in
de Quidt, Fetzer and Ghatak (2016), where we derive as a function of S the
value of l such that all lenders earn zero profits. Except for a unique value
for S (at which both contracts break even) the equilibrium involves either all
lenders offering IL (when S is low) or all lenders offering JL (when S is high).
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C Additional tables
Table 4: Non Profit Status and Legal Status
For-Profit Non-Profit Total
Legal Status
Unknown 6 0 6
Bank 103 8 111
Credit Union / Cooper 4 248 252
NBFI 350 114 464
NGO 8 464 472
Other 6 9 15
Rural Bank 86 2 88
563 845 1,408
Notes: MFIs by legal status and profit status in our sample.
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Table 5: MFI Characteristics for MFIs reporting IL share by Gross Loan Portfolio
Full Sample Weakly Balanced Strongly Balanced
Mean N Mean N p Mean N p
IL Share by Number of Loans 0.60 1538.00 0.58 881.00 0.59 0.58 368.00 0.71
IL Share by Loan Value 0.64 1476.00 0.64 883.00 0.80 0.64 368.00 0.94
Non Profit 0.60 1408.00 0.61 883.00 0.44 0.63 368.00 0.45
Non-Regulated 0.33 1768.00 0.37 883.00 0.33 0.45 368.00 0.02
NGO 0.32 1898.00 0.37 883.00 <0.01 0.44 368.00 0.01
Portfolio at Risk 90 days 6.43 1732.00 5.64 881.00 0.18 4.77 368.00 <0.01
Return on Assets -0.25 1657.00 0.54 881.00 0.04 1.69 368.00 <0.01
Profit Margin -4.88 1741.00 0.11 882.00 0.01 5.12 368.00 <0.01
MFI Risk Rating (1-5) 2.65 1920.00 2.97 883.00 <0.01 3.58 368.00 <0.01
Capital to Asset Ratio 36.77 1813.00 31.93 882.00 0.13 29.75 368.00 0.68
Debt to Equity Ratio 8.47 1772.00 4.94 882.00 0.11 7.18 368.00 0.07
Average Loan Balance 6405.76 1906.00 1415.59 883.00 0.37 1323.51 368.00 0.34
Cost per Borrower 304.37 1514.00 237.52 874.00 0.06 202.35 368.00 <0.01
Write Offs/ Assets 2.36 1623.00 2.20 880.00 0.30 2.19 368.00 0.53
Notes: Comparison of sample means across different samples used in the main table. Weakly balanced refers to
MFIs reporting lending method by gross loan portfolio at least twice from 2008 - 2011, while strongly balanced only
includes MFIs that report data on lending method by gross loan portfolio in each year between 2008-2011. We report
the 2009 values where available (since 2009 has the greatest data availability), otherwise we take the closest available
datapoint (averaging 2008 and 2010 when both are available). The number of MFIs changes as not all institutions
report data on all the characteristics explored. “Mean” reports the average of the characteristic, “N” reports the
number of MFIs included in the relevant sample, while “p-value” reports the significance of the difference in means
between the respective sample and the remainder of the full sample.
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Table 6: Additional country-level controls, IL shares by number of loans
Strongly Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Commercial bank density -0.110 -0.151*** -0.032 -0.073* -0.062* -0.026
(0.075) (0.053) (0.020) (0.039) (0.034) (0.017)
Non Profit -0.166*** -0.200*** -0.124*** -0.184***
(0.050) (0.052) (0.038) (0.041)
Non-Profit x Bank Branch Density 0.134** 0.197*** 0.048** 0.103** 0.102** 0.038**
(0.065) (0.066) (0.020) (0.041) (0.039) (0.016)
Further Interactions:
Urban population share -0.026 -0.056 -0.990 -0.253 1.615 -0.322
(0.452) (1.283) (1.383) (0.266) (1.418) (0.883)
Non Profit x Urban population share 0.129 -0.085 -0.207 0.094 -0.220 -0.288
(0.487) (0.526) (1.844) (0.358) (0.386) (1.812)
Mobile Phones/100 people -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Non Profit x Mobile Phones/100 people -0.006*** -0.004** 0.001 -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP per capita -0.006 -0.004 -0.013** -0.020* -0.006 -0.013**
(0.017) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005)
Non Profit x GDP per capita 0.018 0.007 -0.021** 0.019 0.005 -0.008
(0.026) (0.028) (0.009) (0.022) (0.023) (0.011)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? .024 .046** .016 .03 .039*** .013*
(.0524) (.0179) (.0111) (.0379) (.0148) (.00711)
MFIs 334 334 334 792 792 792
Countries 58 58 58 82 82 82
Observations 1335 1335 1335 2517 2517 2517
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of individual liability loans provided by an MFI. Strongly balanced refers to a
balanced dataset for which lending methodology data is available for the period 2008-2011, while weakly balanced includes
only MFIs that report this information at least twice. All regressions control in addition for the Share of Agriculture in
GDP, Share of Industry in GDP, Development Assistance received and their respective interactions with the non-profit
indicator. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
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Table 7: Additional country-level controls, IL shares by Gross Loan Portfolio
Strongly Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Commercial bank density -0.122 -0.135** -0.022* -0.085** -0.081* -0.027**
(0.079) (0.059) (0.012) (0.038) (0.042) (0.011)
Non Profit -0.180*** -0.197*** -0.141*** -0.178***
(0.050) (0.053) (0.039) (0.041)
Non-Profit x Bank Branch Density 0.151** 0.201** 0.052** 0.123*** 0.131** 0.052***
(0.073) (0.077) (0.022) (0.044) (0.051) (0.018)
Further Interactions:
Urban population share 0.096 0.607 0.218 -0.175 1.440 -0.195
(0.425) (1.238) (1.210) (0.263) (1.765) (0.824)
Non Profit x Urban population share 0.341 0.220 0.381 0.203 -0.043 0.284
(0.379) (0.452) (2.028) (0.324) (0.345) (2.090)
Mobile Phones/100 people -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Non Profit x Mobile Phones/100 people -0.004*** -0.001 0.001 -0.006*** -0.003** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP per capita -0.009 -0.010* -0.014*** -0.021** -0.009 -0.013***
(0.018) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009) (0.005)
Non Profit x GDP per capita 0.010 -0.006 -0.028*** 0.006 -0.003 -0.032***
(0.026) (0.030) (0.008) (0.021) (0.023) (0.008)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? .028 .065*** .03* .038 .05** .025**
(.0522) (.0211) (.0148) (.0328) (.0196) (.0112)
MFIs 327 327 327 753 753 753
Countries 54 54 54 81 81 81
Observations 1307 1307 1307 2392 2392 2392
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share by value of the gross loan portfolio that is under individual liability. Strongly
balanced refers to a balanced dataset for which lending methodology data is available for the period 2008-2011, while weakly
balanced includes only MFIs that report this information at least twice. All regressions control in addition for the Share of
Agriculture in GDP, Share of Industry in GDP, Development Assistance received and their respective interactions with the
non-profit indicator. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 8: Additional fixed effects and MFI-level controls
Panel A: IL Share by Number of Loans
Strongly Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Non Profit -0.179** -0.104 -0.170*** -0.133***
(0.083) (0.074) (0.049) (0.042)
Non-Profit x Bank Branch Density 0.112* 0.016 0.117* 0.020* 0.067* 0.017** 0.076** 0.015*
(0.066) (0.010) (0.070) (0.010) (0.034) (0.008) (0.032) (0.008)
MFIs 348 348 348 348 878 878 874 874
Countries 64 64 64 64 94 94 94 94
Observations 1392 1392 1347 1347 2756 2756 2611 2611
Panel B : IL Share by Gross Loan Portfolio
Strongly Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Non Profit -0.182*** -0.101 -0.173*** -0.138***
(0.066) (0.070) (0.044) (0.040)
Non-Profit x Bank Branch Density 0.139** 0.015 0.131** 0.014 0.093*** 0.019 0.091*** 0.015
(0.059) (0.015) (0.058) (0.017) (0.034) (0.013) (0.031) (0.013)
MFIs 340 340 340 340 831 831 827 827
Countries 60 60 60 60 92 92 92 92
Observations 1360 1360 1318 1318 2605 2605 2467 2467
Country x Year FE X X X X X X X X
MFI FE X X X X
Controls X X X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of individual liability loans provided by an MFI as measured by Number of Loans
(Panel A) or by Value of Loan Portfolio (Panel B). Strongly balanced refers to a balanced dataset for which lending methodology
data is available for the period 2008-2011, while weakly balanced includes only MFIs that report this information at least twice.
Controls include Diamonds, Capital to Asset Ratio, Debt to equity ratio, Average loan balance per borrower, Return on assets,
Financial revenue/Assets , Yield on gross portfolio (nominal), Financial expense/assets, Operating expense/assets. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the country level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 9: IL Share by Number of Loans: Robustness to Other Competition Proxy Variables
Panel A:
Strongly Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Commercial bank density -0.059 -0.088* -0.023 -0.058 -0.047 -0.021
(0.065) (0.052) (0.017) (0.036) (0.029) (0.014)
Non Profit -0.139** -0.179** -0.098* -0.169***
(0.059) (0.077) (0.050) (0.046)
Non-Profit x Bank Branch Density 0.067 0.113* 0.031 0.069** 0.067** 0.024*
(0.052) (0.060) (0.020) (0.029) (0.033) (0.014)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? .008 .024* .008 .011 .02** .003
(.0415) (.0132) (.0116) (.0253) (.00864) (.00621)
MFIs 348 348 348 878 878 878
Countries 64 64 64 94 94 94
Observations 1392 1392 1392 2756 2756 2756
Panel B :
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ATM Density -0.057 -0.050 -0.014 -0.055 -0.023 -0.010
(0.055) (0.047) (0.031) (0.044) (0.037) (0.020)
Non Profit -0.157** -0.209*** -0.109** -0.187***
(0.059) (0.076) (0.051) (0.047)
Non-Profit x ATM Density 0.042 0.057 0.006 0.028 0.026 0.013
(0.045) (0.055) (0.036) (0.042) (0.038) (0.020)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? -.015 .008 -.008 -.027 .003 .003
(.0311) (.0286) (.0289) (.0223) (.0114) (.00823)
MFIs 346 346 346 864 864 864
Countries 63 63 63 91 91 91
Observations 1348 1348 1348 2667 2667 2667
Panel C :
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic Credit Share -0.130** -0.189*** -0.112*** -0.097** -0.086* -0.110***
(0.054) (0.058) (0.037) (0.038) (0.049) (0.038)
Non Profit -0.153*** -0.227*** -0.113** -0.193***
(0.051) (0.061) (0.049) (0.043)
Non-Profit x Domestic Credit Share 0.109* 0.174** 0.066 0.077* 0.086 0.094**
(0.057) (0.075) (0.041) (0.040) (0.054) (0.036)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? -.021 -.015 -.045 -.02 .001 -.016
(.0293) (.0343) (.0309) (.0219) (.0367) (.0208)
MFIs 338 338 338 833 833 833
Countries 61 61 61 88 88 88
Observations 1352 1352 1352 2640 2640 2640
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of individual liability loans provided by an MFI by Number of Loans. Strongly
balanced refers to a balanced dataset for which lending methodology data is available for the period 2008-2011, while weakly
balanced includes only MFIs that report this information at least twice. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
country level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 14
Table 10: IL Share by Gross Loan Portfolio: Robustness to Other Competition Proxy Variables
Panel A:
Strongly Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Commercial bank density -0.090 -0.100** -0.017 -0.075** -0.066** -0.018
(0.064) (0.043) (0.012) (0.033) (0.026) (0.011)
Non Profit -0.151*** -0.182*** -0.119*** -0.170***
(0.051) (0.062) (0.043) (0.041)
Non-Profit x Bank Branch Density 0.086* 0.140** 0.032 0.080*** 0.092*** 0.029
(0.049) (0.054) (0.023) (0.028) (0.032) (0.018)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? -.005 .04** .015 .005 .026** .011
(.04) (.0156) (.017) (.024) (.0122) (.0116)
MFIs 340 340 340 831 831 831
Countries 60 60 60 92 92 92
Observations 1360 1360 1360 2605 2605 2605
Panel B :
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ATM Density -0.096** -0.039 -0.005 -0.066* -0.046 -0.017
(0.037) (0.039) (0.032) (0.035) (0.031) (0.022)
Non Profit -0.168*** -0.201*** -0.133*** -0.189***
(0.049) (0.056) (0.044) (0.043)
Non-Profit x ATM Density 0.066** 0.089** 0.040 0.030 0.043 0.007
(0.032) (0.034) (0.041) (0.035) (0.030) (0.024)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? -.03 .05 .035 -.036* -.003 -.011
(.024) (.0332) (.0372) (.0184) (.0133) (.0102)
MFIs 338 338 338 818 818 818
Countries 59 59 59 90 90 90
Observations 1318 1318 1318 2512 2512 2512
Panel C :
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic Credit Share -0.128*** -0.139** -0.123*** -0.118*** -0.064 -0.103**
(0.048) (0.058) (0.040) (0.033) (0.044) (0.040)
Non Profit -0.158*** -0.203*** -0.137*** -0.195***
(0.043) (0.060) (0.039) (0.041)
Non-Profit x Domestic Credit Share 0.075 0.123 0.101** 0.078** 0.078 0.092**
(0.052) (0.076) (0.042) (0.035) (0.048) (0.037)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? -.053* -.016 -.022 -.04* .013 -.011
(.0305) (.033) (.0251) (.0227) (.0368) (.026)
MFIs 333 333 333 789 789 789
Countries 58 58 58 87 87 87
Observations 1329 1329 1329 2499 2499 2499
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of individual liability loans provided by an MFI by Value of Loan Portfolio. Strongly
balanced refers to a balanced dataset for which lending methodology data is available for the period 2008-2011, while weakly
balanced includes only MFIs that report this information at least twice. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
country level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 15
Table 11: Restricting the Analysis to Non-Village Banks, Institutions that did not switch Legal Status
and have no Discrepancy in IL Shares reporting: Profit Status, Competition and IL Lending
Panel A: IL Share by Number of Loans
Strongly Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Commercial bank density -0.055 -0.066 -0.019 -0.074** -0.042 -0.020
(0.038) (0.042) (0.014) (0.032) (0.038) (0.013)
Non Profit -0.178*** -0.199*** -0.090 -0.170***
(0.062) (0.074) (0.055) (0.047)
Non-Profit x Bank Branch Density 0.063 0.084 0.024 0.071** 0.065 0.023*
(0.047) (0.052) (0.016) (0.035) (0.041) (0.013)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? .009 .017 .005 -.003 .023** .004
(.032) (.0142) (.00935) (.022) (.00922) (.00513)
MFIs 252 252 252 681 681 681
Countries 59 59 59 92 92 92
Observations 993 993 993 2060 2060 2060
Panel B : IL Share by Gross Loan Portfolio
Strongly Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Commercial bank density -0.049 -0.050 -0.009 -0.078** -0.063 -0.010
(0.034) (0.035) (0.008) (0.030) (0.038) (0.009)
Non Profit -0.177*** -0.183** -0.125** -0.186***
(0.064) (0.074) (0.050) (0.049)
Non-Profit x Bank Branch Density 0.062 0.063 0.030 0.081** 0.083* 0.026*
(0.048) (0.048) (0.018) (0.036) (0.042) (0.014)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? .013 .014 .021 .002 .021* .016**
(.0339) (.0166) (.0131) (.0227) (.0118) (.00791)
MFIs 243 243 243 639 639 639
Countries 54 54 54 91 91 91
Observations 925 925 925 1880 1880 1880
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of individual liability loans provided by an MFI as measured by Number
of Loans (Panel A) or by Value of Loan Portfolio (Panel B). Strongly balanced refers to a balanced dataset for which
lending methodology data is available for the period 2008-2011, while weakly balanced includes only MFIs that report this
information at least twice. The analysis only includes non-village banks, institutions that did not switch legal status and
have no discrepancy in IL shares reported. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level, with stars
indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
16
Table 12: Including Peru with IL Share by Number of Loans: Robustness to Other Competition Proxy
Variables
Panel A:
Strongly Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Commercial bank density -0.023 -0.032 -0.009 -0.028 -0.029 -0.010
(0.048) (0.052) (0.012) (0.037) (0.027) (0.009)
Non Profit -0.156** -0.202** -0.112** -0.182***
(0.059) (0.077) (0.050) (0.046)
Non-Profit x Bank Branch Density 0.021 0.044 0.013 0.035 0.034 0.010
(0.051) (0.066) (0.013) (0.036) (0.037) (0.010)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? -.002 .012 .004 .006 .005 0
(.0342) (.0171) (.00987) (.0233) (.0157) (.00574)
MFIs 378 378 378 932 932 932
Countries 65 65 65 95 95 95
Observations 1512 1512 1512 2934 2934 2934
Panel B :
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ATM Density -0.052 -0.049 -0.012 -0.054 -0.023 -0.009
(0.054) (0.047) (0.030) (0.043) (0.036) (0.019)
Non Profit -0.173*** -0.226*** -0.120** -0.194***
(0.057) (0.070) (0.049) (0.044)
Non-Profit x ATM Density 0.041 0.056 0.002 0.027 0.025 0.011
(0.046) (0.056) (0.034) (0.041) (0.038) (0.019)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? -.01 .007 -.009 -.027 .002 .003
(.0281) (.0281) (.0279) (.0204) (.0117) (.00824)
MFIs 376 376 376 918 918 918
Countries 64 64 64 92 92 92
Observations 1468 1468 1468 2845 2845 2845
Panel C :
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic Credit Share -0.125** -0.180*** -0.110*** -0.100*** -0.079* -0.108***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.036) (0.034) (0.045) (0.037)
Non Profit -0.166*** -0.227*** -0.123*** -0.196***
(0.046) (0.050) (0.046) (0.038)
Non-Profit x Domestic Credit Share 0.113** 0.165*** 0.067 0.083** 0.085* 0.094**
(0.051) (0.060) (0.040) (0.037) (0.047) (0.036)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? -.012 -.015 -.043 -.017 .006 -.014
(.0299) (.0306) (.0299) (.0214) (.0352) (.0201)
MFIs 368 368 368 887 887 887
Countries 62 62 62 89 89 89
Observations 1472 1472 1472 2818 2818 2818
Year FE X X X X X X
Region FE X X
Country FE X X
MFI FE X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of individual liability loans provided by an MFI by Number of Loans. Strongly
balanced refers to a balanced dataset for which lending methodology data is available for the period 2008-2011, while weakly
balanced includes only MFIs that report this information at least twice. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
country level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 13: Ruling out Time Varying Regulatory Shocks and Sensitivity to India: Profit Status, Competition
and IL Lending
Panel A: IL Share by Number of Loans
Strongly Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Commercial bank density -0.113** -0.138*** -0.149*** -0.059** -0.056 -0.059
(0.054) (0.043) (0.045) (0.029) (0.037) (0.037)
Non Profit -0.238*** -0.073 -0.093 -0.203*** -0.116** -0.125**
(0.077) (0.059) (0.076) (0.042) (0.046) (0.056)
Non-Profit x Bank Branch Density 0.142** 0.198*** 0.213*** 0.081** 0.091** 0.095**
(0.064) (0.062) (0.064) (0.033) (0.043) (0.044)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? .029** .06*** .064*** .022** .036** .036**
(.0144) (.0226) (.023) (.00835) (.0173) (.0174)
MFIs 310 348 310 803 878 803
Countries 63 64 63 93 94 93
Observations 1240 1392 1240 2506 2756 2506
Panel B : IL Share by Gross Loan Portfolio
Strongly Balanced Weakly Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Commercial bank density -0.115** -0.091*** -0.098*** -0.074*** -0.063** -0.063**
(0.046) (0.031) (0.032) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Non Profit -0.214*** -0.053 -0.057 -0.196*** -0.104** -0.102*
(0.069) (0.056) (0.065) (0.041) (0.045) (0.055)
Non-Profit x Bank Branch Density 0.156** 0.131** 0.141*** 0.101*** 0.089** 0.089**
(0.059) (0.050) (0.050) (0.033) (0.035) (0.036)
Joint test :
Comp + Non-Profit x Comp = 0? .041** .04 .042 .027** .027 .026
.0163 .0257 .0259 .0117 .0191 .0192
MFIs 305 340 305 757 831 757
Countries 59 60 59 91 92 91
Observations 1220 1360 1220 2362 2605 2362
India included? No No No No
Country FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X
Region x Legal Status x Year FE X X X X
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of individual liability loans provided by an MFI as measured by Number of
Loans (Panel A) or by Value of Loan Portfolio (Panel B). Strongly balanced refers to a balanced dataset for which lending
methodology data is available for the period 2008-2011, while weakly balanced includes only MFIs that report this information
at least twice. The analysis focuses on the sensitivity of results to India and controls for time varying regulatory shocks that
affect MFIs by different legal status differentially across regions. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country
level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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